

Internal Colonialism in Multicultural Societies: How Ethno-nationalism Affects**“Bystander” Groups.***David Pettinicchio**Maria Sironi**Department of Sociology, University of Oxford*

This paper seeks to explore the ways in which ethnic nationalism affects groups that are not directly implicated in the conflict. Specifically, the paper investigates how ethno-nationalist economic policies meant to dismantle a cultural division of labor (a feature of internal colonialism) and improve economic opportunities for the subordinate group affects other members of multicultural societies who are neither the subordinate or superordinate group. I focus on the case of Quebec nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s. Ethno-nationalist policies improved the economic return for Francophones, but diminished the economic return for Anglophones. Not surprisingly, Anglophones, especially they had ineffective voice, chose to migrate to other Canadian provinces. But Quebec and Canada are multicultural societies. In the 1970s, ethno-linguistic groups (the largest including Italian, German and Yiddish) represented a significant share of the population. Assuming that they too were affected by ethno-nationalist economic policies, how did they respond to ethnic nationalism? Did they view this as an incentive or disincentive? Using the survival method for predicting net gains or losses in populations across census divisions, we investigate the nature of migration patterns of groups that are

neither French nor English. In so doing, we seek to compare others' migration patterns to that of English and French and uncover whether others' migration might have been politically motivated. Since few studies have considered how internal colonialism and cultural division of labor applied in multicultural societies, it is difficult to base expectations on these theories. However, since many of the largest ethnic groups in Quebec identified with the Anglophone minority when it comes to education and English as a second language, we would expect their migration patterns to be more like Anglophones, and less like that of Francophones whose migration patterns can be understood in terms of new economic opportunities created by ethno-nationalist parties.

In the 1970s, approximately twenty percent of Québec's Anglophone population out-migrated from the province largely as a response to ethno-nationalist economic policies (such as the francization of the workplace). This is sometimes referred to as the "great Anglo exodus." At the same time, while the post-WWII period saw an influx of new immigrants to Quebec mainly from Europe, by the 1970s, many non-Anglophones (but not Francophones) were exiting the province likely moving elsewhere in Canada. Between 1976 and 1981, over 130 000 individuals left Quebec for another place in Canada and only about 25 000 entered the province. The 1970s saw the highest loss of individuals in the 20th century and a drop in Quebec's attractiveness as a place to migrate to (Linteau et al. 1986).

Scholars studying migration patterns in Quebec during this period have offered two explanations especially for Anglophone exit. On the one hand, outmigration was the result of the declining manufacturing sector and move of the financial sector from Montreal to Toronto. Thus migration is largely economically motivated. On the other hand, scholars have argued that migration patterns especially between Francophones and Anglophones are divergent suggesting that migration may be politically motivated. Unfortunately, these have been difficult to disentangle because ethnic nationalist policies of the time were economically oriented and thus teasing out push and pull factors is not at all straightforward.

While theories like internal colonialism and the cultural division of labor have been applied to the Quebec case, and these have shown how ethno-nationalist policies can increase the costs of staying for some groups and decrease the costs of existing for other groups, little is known about how such theories account for migration by “bystander” groups. That is, groups that are not directly involved in ethnic conflict. In the case of Quebec in the 1970s, we refer to groups whose mother tongue is neither English nor French.




Figure 2

In 1971, individuals whose mother tongue is neither French nor English represent about 6 percent of Quebec's population. As Figure 2 shows, Italians are by far the largest group followed by Germans. While many, with the exception of First Nations are clustered around Montreal, these groups are represented albeit in smaller numbers throughout the province.




Figure 1

As Figure 1 shows, the 1970s saw a negative net-migration the entire decade, with a spike in the late 1970s which in part is a result of ethnic nationalism.

Ethnic Nationalist Economic Policies

Until the end of the 1950s, Anglophones had maintained a privileged and superordinate position in Québec society, particularly because they controlled Québec's economy. Although it was demographically impossible in a democracy like Canada for Anglophones to form the Québec political class (see Kaufmann and Haklai 2008 on dominant minority/majority ethnicity within democracies), Anglophones had considerable political clout by virtue of their economic dominance. In fact, before the 1960s, Francophones composed 80 per cent of Québec's population and controlled only

22 per cent and 26 percent of the manufacturing and financial sectors, respectively (Fraser 2001). This is characteristic of a cultural division of labour (CDL) whereby Anglophones are the employers, business owners and managers, and Francophones the employees, labourers and workers (Hughes 1938a and 1938b). The election of the Liberal Party in 1960 ushered in the Quiet Revolution: a political movement that not only modernised and secularised the province, but that effectively undermined Anglophone dominance in Québec and dismantled the CDL. Economic ethno-nationalist policies continued throughout the 1970s under the Parti Québécois regime.

These policies, while having positive economic effects for highly educated professional Francophones, increased the costs for highly educated, professional English-speakers of remaining in Québec. These costs clearly outweighed the costs of migrating as many Anglophones (about 80% of those who left moved to the neighboring Canadian province of Ontario). Québec ethnic nationalism is an important example of the ways in which the breakdown in the cultural division of labor led to important economic consequences shaping decisions to leave the province.




Figure 3

In his study, Pettinicchio (2012) found that sixty-four of the 100 divisions experienced net Anglophone out-migration between 1971 and 1981 compared to forty-two divisions that experienced Francophone out-migration. Figure 3 shows that a considerable number of divisions also experienced the outmigration of others. Over one-third of all divisions that experienced net Anglo out-migration were on the island of Montréal and twelve of the top twenty divisions with the highest net Anglophone out-migration rate were in Montréal. While many of the divisions experiencing others' outmigration were in Montreal where a significant ethnic community exists, this was by no means limited to that region. The data suggests that Francophone in-migration to Montréal occurred

because Francophones were taking advantage of new economic opportunities (especially in the financial sector) created by the Quiet Revolution. He finds that division resources are negatively related to Anglophone migration. This means that more resource-rich divisions have greater Anglophone outmigration (or less in-migration), net the effects of other political, economic and cultural variables. On the other hand, division resources are positively related to Francophone migration, which means that resource-rich divisions experience Francophone in-migration. The ecological analysis lends support to the argument that Anglophone migration in Québec is not simply a matter of individuals responding to better economic opportunities. The divergent effects of division resources on Anglophone and Francophone migration suggest that, because nationalistic policies negatively affected Anglophones' economic position in Québec, while positively affecting Francophones' position, Anglophones in resource-rich divisions were exiting. His analysis of individual level data also suggests that well-to-do Francophones were remaining in Québec while resource-rich Anglophones were leaving. Theories like internal colonialism and resource competition have called into question the impermeable nature of ethnicity, suggesting that ethnicity is politically constructed (Nagel 1986). They also 'reject the assumption that primordial ethnicity will decline in modern states' (Olzak 1982: 256), highlighting the relevance of ethnic nationalism in industrialised countries.

Bystanders

This sort of understanding makes sense when "us vs. them" includes the groups involved in the conflict. But Québec is a multicultural society embedded in a broader context of

Canadian multiculturalism. What of ethnic minority groups who are neither Francophone nor Anglophone? How did they respond to Québec nationalism? Bystanders – those who are not directly implicated in ethnic conflict – are typically ignored in studies of ethnic nationalism particularly because most examples of nationalism are either not focused on multicultural societies or ignore the presence of other ethnic groups. It is important to consider non-violent responses to ethnic nationalism such as emigration, given the continued salience of ethno-nationalist movements in the West but also for advancing, testing and extending theories of nationalism (see Smith 1983 and 1996). The internal colony model and CDL is a useful analytic tool for understanding the relationship between Francophone ethnic nationalism and Anglophone out-migration (Gellner 1964; Hechter 1975). Yet, it is unclear how, within the scope of this theory, we would make sense of responses to nationalism among groups not directly implicated in the conflict.

On the one hand, many ethnic groups present in Quebec in the post-WWII period had integrated within the Anglophone educational sector. This explains in part why the Parti Québécois passed legislation to limit immigrants' access to English schools. On the other hand, immigrant groups whose mother tongue is neither French nor English may not view francization of the workplace as threatening either their dominance or history and thus may be more willing to adapt rather than exit.

Data and Methods

The aim of the ecological analysis presented in this paper is to explain regional non-Anglophone/Francophone migration (i.e., non-French/non-English mother tongue) in relation to Anglophone and Francophone migration. This involves estimating the net-migration rates using several key division-level characteristics. The dependent variable in the ecological analysis is a measure of the estimated rate of ethnic minority, Anglophone and Francophone net-migration in each census division between 1971 and 1981. The data is obtained from coding 1971 and 1981 census volumes. We then use the life-table survival rate method to estimate the predicted 1981 Anglophone, Francophone, and other mother-tongue populations (see Shryock, Siegel, Larmon, et al. 1975; Pettinicchio 2012). The estimated 1981 populations are obtained by applying a province-wide life table for 1975–6, the midpoint of the time interval, to the enumerated populations in 1971. Survival ratios for groups aged 15 and older using a 1975–6 life table are constructed and applied to the estimated English-speaking, French-speaking, and other-mother tongue populations. This produces the expected population for the census division by age group for each Anglophones, Francophones and others. Population estimates for groups aged 15–19 and 55–64 are then calculated. Age categories 15–19 to 55–64 are used because population values for these are available in both census years. The estimated net migration can be found by subtracting the predicted number of individuals in a division from the observed number of individuals in a division in 1981. This is then converted to a rate by dividing the absolute net-migration by the observed population in 1971. A

positive value indicates net in-migration while a negative value indicates net out-migration.

Independent variables

Resources is a scale ranging from 1 to 5. The scale was intended to capture the extent of a division's physical and human resources and/or capital in order to explain regional variation in out-migration. Divisions were assigned '1' if the values for those divisions on income, per cent professionals (including managers, teachers and persons in the technology and medical sectors), value of dwellings, per cent with ties to the financial sector and per cent with college degrees were greater than province-wide averages.

Thus, divisions that received a '5' were extremely resource-rich because they received a '1' on each of these characteristics.

Credit – this variable measured the extent to which Anglophones were involved in the growing credit union sector in the province, which was an alternative to the Anglophone-dominated traditional banking sector. This information is available in a 1973 document titled *Répertoire des Caisses d'Épargne et de Crédit du Québec* from the Bureau de la Statistique du Québec: Service des Finances. I selected cases based on two criteria: whether the credit union reported its name in English, and whether the manager of the credit union had an English name. The variable was a dummy (1 = the presence of Anglo credit union, 0 = not present).

Manufacturing – the difference between the number of manufacturing establishments in a census division in 1982 and 1972. This information is available in an annual print publication provided by Statistics Canada.

Referendum and election – these variables were intended to capture the local political climate. Referendum was the per cent of individuals voting ‘yes’ in the 1980 referendum on Québec sovereignty. Election was a dummy variable, where ‘1’ represented the Liberal Party losing a previously held riding in the 1976 election.

Culture – a dummy variable (1 = cultural institutions, 0 = no cultural institutions) measuring the presence of museums that provide English-language materials, English-language newspapers and radio stations that broadcast English-language programmes. This information was obtained from a text titled *Données sur le Québec*, published by the Université de Montréal Press (Boily and Trudeau 1974).

Marriage – the per cent married in a division and Logged division population – the log of the total population size of a division. Dominant ethnicity is a control variable meant to capture what the dominant ethnicity is in a census division typically referring to the third largest ethnic group (after English and French).

Findings

Table 1

<i>Y = Net Migration Rate of Non-anglophone and Non-francophone</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Anglophone Migration Rate	0.585**	0.610**	0.589*	0.615*	0.620*	0.618*
	0.213	0.224	0.231	0.24	0.243	0.245
Francophone Migration Rate	0.419**	0.373*	0.354*	0.258	0.082	0.129
	0.150	0.156	0.157	0.173	0.247	0.263
Montreal		0.040	0.040	-0.038	-0.064	-0.047
		0.068	0.069	0.069	0.073	0.079
ln(Total Population)		0.007	0.006	0.008	0.035	0.023
		0.028	0.030	0.029	0.035	0.039
Election			0.070	0.094	0.080	0.079
			0.076	0.082	0.081	0.080
Referendum			0.056	0.079	0.072	0.055
			0.092	0.093	0.100	0.101
Manufacturing				0.001	0.000	0.001
				0.000	0.000	0.001
Resources				0.032	0.033	0.036
				0.020	0.021	0.022
Married					0.026	0.014
					0.021	0.025
Culture					-0.006	0.010
					0.086	0.085
Credit					-0.115	-0.098
					0.073	0.068
Dominant Ethnicity: German						0.138
						0.089
Dominant Ethnicity: Italian						0.100
						0.097
Constant	-0.151***	-0.235	-0.297	-0.362	-1.827	-1.220
	0.041	0.315	0.364	0.358	1.159	1.401
R²	0.20	0.20	0.21	0.23	0.26	0.28
N	100	100	100	100	100	100

We begin by showing whether or not others' migration is affected by the migration of the two dominant linguistic groups in Quebec (1) and find that in fact, both Anglophone and Francophone migration positively affects others' outmigration. Recall that Anglophone

and Francophone migration were explained differently when it comes to resources and Pettinicchio (2012) argued that this lends support to the notion that Anglophones and Francophones were responding differently to ethnic nationalism.

However, our models indicate two important points. First, Francophone migration is no longer a significant predictor when we include a host of variables (5, 6). Rather, Anglophone outmigration remains the only significant predictor. Second, we find that neither resources nor political factors directly shape others' migration. When we include these factors, Anglophones outmigration still remains significant.

Conclusion

Québec ethnic nationalism is an ideal case for testing theories that link ethnic nationalism to non-violent reactions to nationalism like migration. In this paper, we examine the effects of ethnic nationalism on Allophones (non-Francophones or Anglophones whose mother tongue is neither French nor English) at the ecological level. There are two possible scenarios when it comes to explaining migration patterns of Allophone “bystanders.” The first possibility is that their patterns are completely unrelated to those of Anglophones (experiencing outmigration) and Francophones (experiencing in-migration) suggesting that they are largely removed from the conflict. The second scenario is one where ethnic minority groups mostly identifying with (or who have integrated into) the English-speaking community (such as Italians and Greeks) will experience similar migration patterns as Anglophones. This is because these groups are

affected similarly by ethno-nationalist economic policies. On the other hand, groups identifying with the Francophone community – for instance, Haitians – will exhibit migration patterns similar to Francophones because presumably, as French speakers, they too stand to benefit from ethno-nationalist policies. Our paper contributes to the growing interest in political and social demography not only because it seeks to link theories of migration to political and sociological theories of nationalism, but also because it uses demographic methods to test these theories.

Our findings suggest that others' migration is not directly explained by either economic or political factors at the regional level. However, it may be the case that these factors indirectly shape others migration to the extent that the most robust predictor of others' migration is Anglophone migration. Given that the factors explaining Anglophone migration, as Pettinicchio (2012) shows, work differently than for Francophones – namely that Anglophones experienced the highest exit in resource rich regions – their migration may act as a signal for others. The next step is to examine micro level data, such as IPUMS, in order to get more precise measures at the individual level in comparing others' migration to that of Anglophones and Francophones.