Value-Oriented Marriage Behavior in Japan

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Introduction

The primary purpose of this paper is to examine whether Japanese marriage patterns are affected by ideational factors. As is well known, marriage patterns have changed over the past few decades across many industrialized countries. To site one example of pattern change, people are marrying much later in life than has been previously seen. By 2009, male age at first marriage had risen to around 32 years in France and the United Kingdom, and 33 years in Italy and Germany. In the same year, women entered into marriage at around their thirtieth birthday in France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Germany (see Graph 1).

Graph 1: Mean age at first marriage in 2009, selected countries

Japan is no exception. Marriage has undergone drastic changes in Japan in recent years. As will be shown later, the timing of entry into marriage is becoming increasingly delayed; concurrently, bachelors and spinsters are increasing in number. Under these circumstances, it would seem that marriage is losing its appeal; the attractive glow that it once held in Japan is clearly diminishing. In the European context, it has been argued that attitudinal factors play a key role in determining
marriage behaviour. It has, however, not sufficiently examined the impact of ideational factors on Japanese marriage patterns.

In this paper, we will begin by showing the changing patterns of Japanese marriage. Then, we will review theories of marriage behaviour. Thereafter, the determinants of marriage behaviour will be examined, followed by an explanation of data and methods used this analysis. Finally, we will conclude this paper with our findings and summary.

**Changing Japanese Marriage Patterns**

In this section, we will show two important changes in Japanese marriage patterns. The first change to be noted is a sharp rise in men's and women's marriage ages. The Japanese marriage age did not rise continuously over the post-war period. Looking at the whole period after the Second World War, age at marriage remained quite stable until the end of 1970s (see Graph 2). Japanese men, on the average, got married at around age 26, while women entered into a married status at around their 25th birthday. However, marriage age rose rapidly in Japan from the latter half of the 1970s and onwards. In fact, the mean age at first marriage for men rose sharply from 27.0 in 1975 to 30.5 in 2010; for women, first-marriage age also increased, from 24.7 to 28.8, over the same period. It follows that the timing of marriage became delayed by approximately three years over the course of these three decades. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that this rise in marriage age went hand in hand with a fertility decline. As seen Graph 2, the Japanese period total fertility rate (PTFR) remained stable at about two births per woman from 1957 until 1973, except for a dip in 1966, the ‘Year of the Fire Horse,’ which has been traditionally considered an unlucky year for giving birth to girls. However, the PTFR started to show a downward trend from the mid-70s, falling from 2.14 births per woman in 1973 to 1.39 in 2010 in tandem with a rise in marriage age.
The second change is an increase in the numbers of unmarried men and women, which is coincidently occurring with the aforementioned delayed entry into married status and increasing life-long celibacies in number (Raymo, 1998; Retherford, Ogawa, and Matsukura, 2001). Theoretically, a rise in marriage age does not always result in an increase in the proportion of people never-married. For example, if young adults who remained single in their 30s rush to marry in their 40s, they can avoid becoming life-long celibates. Yet, the postponement of marriage timing is connected to an increase in the proportion of single middle-aged adults in Japan. As clearly shown in Graph 3, the proportion of single men and women has steadily increased since 1980. To take an example, the percentage of men aged 50 to 54 who had never married was only 2.1% in 1980, whereas the percentage sharply jumped to 17.8% in 2010. Likewise, the proportion of never-married women in the 50–54 age group also rose steeply from 4.4% in 1980 to 8.7% in 2010.
Graph 3: The percentage of never-married people in Japan

(a) Men

Year
- 1960
- 1970
- 1980
- 1990
- 2000
- 2010

(b) Women

Year
- 1960
- 1970
- 1980
- 1990
- 2000
- 2010

Source: The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (various years). National Census.
Compared with other developed countries, Japan has a relatively small number of extramarital births and cohabiting couples. Furthermore, the divorce rate is also considerably low, although it is on an upward trend. Taking these points into consideration, it can be argued that a transition to married status has suffered a most conspicuous change in Japan.

Theoretical Background

Marriage patterns in developed countries have mainly been explained from either a socio-economic or an ideational viewpoint. Hence, in this section, we will focus our review on these two influential theoretical frameworks for marriage behaviour, i.e., the economic approach and the ideational approach.

The economic approach to marriage behaviour was founded by Gary Becker and developed chiefly by economists (Becker, 1973, 1974, 1976; Cigno, 1991; Ermisch, 2003; Freiden, 1974; Santos, 1975). The significant feature of this approach is the application of ‘the principle of comparative advantage’, proposed by David Ricardo, in the analysis of marriage behaviour. To be concrete, this analytical framework begins with two basic theoretical assumptions. The first assumption is that men and women allocate their own time to market activity and domestic activity. When engaged in market activity, people work and earn money, while people engaged in domestic activity produce ‘household commodities’ such as meals, good health, washed clothing, and children. The consumption of commodities occurs in domestic activity in order to maximise their own utility. The second assumption is a difference between men and women with regard to productivity in these two activities. For instance, if men earn a higher wage in the labour market than women, it can be assumed that men’s efficiency in market activity is relatively superior to that of women. In contrast, if women can perform domestic work more efficiently than men, the level of productivity in domestic work may be assumed to be higher for women than men. Based on these two assumptions, marriage is, in the theory,
regarded as the trading process of products between a single man and woman for maximising their mutual utility (satisfaction). More specifically, if, after marriage, one of the partners with a comparative advantage in market production specialises in market work, and the other with a comparative advantage in household production devotes herself or himself to domestic work, then their total utility will become greater and they will be better off by being married than by remaining single. As a result, they will enter into marriage. Conversely, single men and women will not marry and trade their products with each other if the gains from marriage are negative; that is, if each partner perceives that he or she will be worse off by being married than by remaining single. In short, men and women will marry only if it increases their utility. Otherwise, they will remain single.

From this viewpoint, recent marriage patterns in developed countries may be regarded as a natural consequence of the decrease of gains from marriage. More specifically, in a society where there is a large gap between men and women with regard to earning capacity in the labour market, it becomes a good strategy for them to marry. For instance, if a man can earn more money than a woman, a husband would then specialise in market work and a wife in domestic work. The wife would thereby trade part of her domestic products with her husband in exchange for part of his income. As a result, their utility is maximized. However, as is seen in several industrialised countries, if women’s earning capacity rises and the level of their wages approaches that of men’s wages, women’s specialisation in domestic work after marriage brings smaller benefits to them than before. This consequently reduces the incentive to marry, leading to a delay or an avoidance of marriage.

It should be kept in mind that an individual preference, or utility is assumed as given and fixed in economic explanations for marriage behaviour. In other words, an individual's taste for marriage is unchangeable. Hence, newly emerging features of marriage behaviour are interpreted as the simple consequences of socio-economic changes such as wage levels and employment opportunities, under the assumption of a fixed preference.
It is, however, debatable whether or not marriage behaviour is entirely accounted for by these factors. First of all, the economic approach does not satisfactorily explain why a considerable number of couples prefer cohabitation to marriage. In 1998, for instance, the proportion of cohabiting women in the 20–24 age group reached 45% in Denmark, 25% in France, 39% in Sweden, and 13% in Britain (Kiernan, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004a, 2004b). Likewise, cohabiting men in the same age group stood at 43%, 13%, 24%, and 12% respectively. Cohabiting couples are legally unmarried, but their living arrangements are considerably similar to those of married couples. A cohabiting couple lives under one roof, as a married couple does. Thus, there is not a large difference in gains from marriage between married and cohabiting couples. Admittedly, cohabitation, in some cases, ends in marriage, serving as a kind of prelude to marriage. Yet, in other cases, couples continue to cohabit lifelong as an alternative to marriage. Taking these points into consideration, it is difficult to explain changes in marital behaviour only by socio-economic factors such as wage levels. Second, according to the economic approach, if the productivity of men and women were completely equal both in the market sphere and the domestic sphere, no man and woman would, in theory, marry, since the comparative advantage between both sexes would have disappeared. However, it is doubtful whether this is a case in the real world. In fact, the Wage Gender Gap in 2009 was 21.6 in Germany and 12.1 in Denmark (OECD, 2011), the marriage rate in 2009 was 4.6 per 1,000 population in Germany and 6.0 in Denmark. Although the comparative advantage between men’s and women’s wages is smaller in Denmark than in Germany, the former yields a greater marriage rate than the latter. This evidence indicates that marriage behaviour is not a simple function of wage levels. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that women’s greater earning capacity may encourage marriage rather than discourage it. In fact, Goldscheider and Waite (1986) find that women’s earning power is positively related to their propensity to marry in the U.S. This evidence suggests that, even when married life cannot be maintained solely by a man’s income, the addition of a woman’s income enables the
man and woman to marry and make their married life together sustainable.

On the other hand, the ideational approach emphasises the influence of values and attitudes on marriage behaviour in developed countries. This approach holds that, beyond the simple economic calculation of utility, ideational factors play a key role in marriage behaviour in developed countries. Specifically, it is maintained in the ideational approach that one’s preference for marriage changes in tandem with the development of society one lives in. In other words, if people’s attitudes change in a society, an individual's preference in partnership relations is also transformed, leading to different behavioural patterns (Lesthaeghe, 1983, 1995, 2010; Lesthaeghe and Meekers, 1986; Lesthaeghe and Surkyn, 1983; van de Kaa, 1980, 1987, 2003).

With reference to the influence of ideational factors on marriage behaviour, suffice it to say here that there are two salient features of changes which the ideational theory claims that developed industrialized society is experiencing. First, the influence of traditional norms and values, such as a religious doctrine that regulated individual behaviour in the past, has been weakening in these countries. This change allows people to cherish a progressive idea and to enjoy much freedom of choice in behaviour, as a result of which cohabitation and delaying or avoiding marriage have become accepted more broadly in society (Lesthaeghe and Meekers, 1986; van de Kaa, 1987). Second, due to an increase in affluence and security, a strong commitment to individualism has manifested itself in industrialised countries, and kindled aspirations toward self-fulfilment and self-expression in a social sphere rather than a domestic sphere (Maslow, 1970; Inglehart, 1977, 1990, 1997). This attitude motivates individuals to attain their goals in the social sphere and to choose a more self-reliant and independent lifestyle. Consequently, people have become more reluctant to marry.

Data and Method

The present analysis uses data from the Japanese Generations and Gender Survey (JGGS), a nationwide panel survey with a target population of men and women
between ages 18 and 69 in Japan. 150,000 individuals were selected by two-stage stratified probability sampling. The first wave of the JGGS was conducted in 2004 and its overall response rate amounted to 57.4%. The second wave of the survey was carried out in 2007 with 67.5% of the respondents who answered a questionnaire in the first wave of the survey. The third follow-up survey was conducted in 2010 and its response rate stood at 72.6% of respondents from the second wave. In this analysis, we selected unmarried men and women at the time of the first survey. As for divorcees, widows, and widowers, their remarriage behaviour is likely to be affected by their marital history. However, since the JGGS does not have sufficient information on the marital histories of divorcees, widows, and widowers, they were excluded from the present analysis. As a result, 266 men and 358 women between 20 and 45 years of age at the time of the first survey were selected for the analysis.

In the present analysis, we employ the latent class event-history analysis (Hagenaars, 1993; Hagenaars and McCutcheon, 2002; Vermunt, 1997). The latent class event-history analysis is a hazard analysis including manifest and latent variables as covariates. The model of the analysis is expressed as follows:

$$h(t) = \frac{\exp(\alpha + \gamma_kw_k + \sum \beta_jx_j)}{1 + \exp(\alpha + \gamma_kw_k + \sum \beta_jx_j)} \quad \cdots (1)$$

Here, \(h(t)\) is the probability of occurring an event at time \(t\); \(\alpha\) is a constant term; \(w_k\) is a category \(k\) of latent-class variable \(w\); \(\gamma_k\) is a parameter of the category; \(x_j\) is a manifest independent variable \(x\); and \(\beta_j\) is a parameter of the variable.

$$\log\left[\frac{h(t)}{1-h(t)}\right] = \alpha + \gamma_kw_k + \sum \beta_jx_j \quad \cdots (2)$$
After taking the logit transformation of (1), equation (2) indicates the discrete-time hazard model. The important feature of this model is that it distinguishes between the effects of both manifest and latent covariates on event occurrences. In this analysis, we examine the probability of getting married after the first wave of the JGGS. The dependent variable is, therefore, the hazard rate of respondents’ experiencing their first marriage after the year 2004.

We used the following six opinion items as attitudinal variables:

(1) The main purpose of marriage is to have children.
(2) It is all right for a man and woman to live together without being married.
(3) It is much better for everyone if the man earns the main living and the woman takes care of the home and family.
(4) Parents should provide financial help for their adult children when the children are having financial difficulties.
(5) A man can have a full and satisfying life without marrying (only for men).
(6) A woman can have a full and satisfying life without marrying (only for women).

After constructing latent classes by these categorical variables, we will examine the influence of attitudes on marriage behaviour.

Results of Latent-Class Event-History Analysis
The results of our latent-class event-history analysis for male marriage are displayed in Table 1. The first impression of Model 1 in Table 1 is that men’s income plays an important role in marriage behaviour. In other words, as men’s income increases, more men enter into marriage. For instance, the risk of getting married is 6.5 times greater for men earning 3,000,000–3,990,000 yen a year than for those earning less than less than 2,000,000 yen. Furthermore, when men’s annual income amounted to greater than or equal to 4,000,000 yen, the risk of their marrying was 7.9 times greater.
than the risk of men earning the least income.

As for co-residence with parents, fewer men who lived with their parents married than men who did not live with their parents. The hazard rate for men living with parents was 85% lower than the rate for men not living with parents. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the long duration of residence among young adults in the parental home is connected to the delay in marriage in Mediterranean countries (Billari and Rosina, 2004). As is the case in these countries, due to a strong parent–child attachment, co-residence with parents may provide sons with comfortable living arrangements in Japan. Indeed, since domestic work such as washing, cooking, and cleaning is mainly performed by mothers, living in the parental home is quite convenient for unmarried sons.

Interestingly, the birth order of sons did not show a statistically significant effect on the hazard rate of marriage. The ‘Ie’ family system is often referred to as the Japanese cultural tradition of primogeniture. If this system remains influential to the family formation process, the first son should marry earlier than other sons in order to maintain his family line. Yet, the results of our analysis reveal that there is no difference in the risk of marriage of first sons and other sons. It therefore follows that the influence of the Ie family system is very weak in contemporary Japan.

With regard to men’s occupations, the ‘professional’ category revealed the greatest coefficient (see Table 1, Model 2). In concrete terms, men engaged in a professional or a managerial job had a hazard rate of marriage that was 5.2 times greater than the rate for men who were out of employment. Similarly, the ‘clerical’ group and the ‘manual’ group also yielded a statistically significant coefficient. The hazard rates for both groups were approximately 4.9 times greater than the rates for the ‘out of employment’ group. This evidence suggests that economic stability plays a crucial role in determining whether men marry.

Models 3 and 4 of Table 1 were prepared to examine the effects of cohabitation on marriage behaviour. As might be expected, the experience of cohabitation increases the risk of marriage significantly (see Table 1, Model 3). The
hazard rate of marriage was 2.2 times greater for men who had experienced cohabitation than for men who had never experienced it. Yet, the cohabitation variable becomes insignificant in Model 4 of Table 1 after we control the influence of premarital pregnancy on entry into marriage. In contrast, the coefficient of premarital pregnancy is statistically significant. The risk of marriage was 3.2 times greater for men with a premarital pregnancy than for men without a premarital pregnancy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Covariate</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
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In terms of ideational factors, men with conservative attitudes significantly increase a risk of marriage (see Table 1, Model 5). Compared to men with neutral attitudes, men with conservative attitudes yielded an 8.3 times greater risk of marriage.
We can, therefore, argue that not only economic but also ideational factors affect male marriage behaviour. It should, however, be borne in mind that the influence of ideational factors is not so strong. According to the result of the log-likelihood ratio test, Model 5 of Table 1 is more fitted than Model 6 excluding the attitudinal variables from Model 5. Yet, the value of BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion) is slightly smaller in Model 5 of Table 1 than in Model 6 of the same table. Thus, the goodness of fit is slightly better for the model with ideational variables than the model without them.

Now let us turn to women’s marriage. Table 2 displays the results of women’s event-history analysis. As is the case of men, highly salaried women had a higher hazard rate of marriage (see Table 2, Model 1). Compared with women who earned less than 2,000,000 yen per year, those who earned greater than or equal to 4,000,000 yen per year yielded a 3.4 times greater risk of marriage. Likewise, the hazard rate of marriage was 3.4 times higher for women who earned 3,000,000–3,990,000 yen per year. According to the new home economics theory, high earning power in women should result in a low probability of marriage by a reduction in the gains from marriage. Yet, as seen in Table 2, the reverse is the case; since high earning power in women serves to enhance the economic viability of married life, women with higher salaries may be more likely to marry than women with lower incomes.

Interestingly, co-residence with parents does not have a significant effect on female entry into marriage, while living in the parental home bears a significant affect on males when it comes to marriage. In an analysis of Japanese marriage, it was found that women living with their parents delay the transition to marriage when they perform only a small amount of domestic work in their parental home (Raymo, 2003a, 2003b; Raymo and Ono, 2007). This finding suggests that the amount of domestic work to be performed, rather than co-residence itself, plays an essential role in these women's entry into marriage. Unmarried sons hardly ever perform domestic work
When they live with parents in Japan. Thus, living with parents is favourable for these men. By contrast, unmarried daughters are to some extent forced to perform domestic work while they live at home with their parents. Because of this, co-residence with parents has a significant effect on whether and when males marry, but does not have an affect on females' entry into marriage.

As is the case with men, birth order does not affect women’s marriage significantly. If the maintenance of a family line is still important in Japanese society, a first child will be encouraged to marry earlier than a second or third child. Yet, neither sons’ nor daughters’ birth order affect the risk of marriage.

With reference to female occupation, the ‘professional’ and ‘clerical’ categories yield a large risk of marriage (see Table 2, Model 2). For instance, the hazard rate of marriage was 2.5 times greater for women engaged in a professional job than those who were out of employment. The reason for the difference in the occupational effect appears to follow along similar lines with the case for income. To be specific, since a professional or a clerical job make marriage more economically viable, women in these jobs exhibit a greater marriage probability.

Models 3 and 4 of Table 2 were provided to examine the influence of cohabitation on marriage. First of all, the experience of cohabitation increases a risk of marriage significantly. Compared with women who had ever experienced cohabitation, those who had not experienced it produced a hazard rate of marriage 2.3 times greater (see Table 2, Model 3). Interestingly, the experience of cohabitation is still statistically significant in Model 4 of Table 2, which includes premarital pregnancy as a covariate. In the case of men, when premarital pregnancy was included in the model, cohabitation experience changed from significant to insignificant. Yet, such a change is not seen in the case of women. This evidence suggests that the entry into cohabitation is a prelude to marriage for women.

Finally, we will examine the effect of ideational factors on marriage behaviour. As shown in Model 5 of Table 2, progressive attitudes significantly reduce a risk of marriage. Compared with women of neutral attitudes, those with progressive
attitudes had an approximately 90% lower hazard rate of marriage. We can therefore argue that ideational factors affect female marriage behaviour. We should not, however, overlook that the goodness of fit is not much improved in Model 5, compared with Model 6 excluding attitudinal variables. Indeed, the value of BIC is not smaller in Model 5 than in Model 6 of Table 2, although the log-likelihood ratio test shows the two models are significantly different from each other. Thus, it follows that the influence of ideational factors on female marriage is not so strong.

Covariate | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
Constant | -3.76 *** | -3.67 *** | -3.71 *** | -4.37 *** | -5.06 *** | -3.20 ***
Women’s Age+ Under 24 | 0.19 | 0.12 | 0.33 | 0.23 | 0.87 | 0.32
25-29 | 0.87 | 0.87 | 0.95 | 0.89 | 0.37 | 0.94
(30-34) | 1.66 * | 1.54 * | 1.30 * | 1.64 * | 0.91 * | 1.17 *
Birth Cohort Before 1969 (1970-74) | -2.52 ** | -2.49 ** | -2.05 ** | -2.42 ** | -2.54 * | -1.92 **
1975-79 | 0.84 | 0.84 | 0.76 | 0.89 | 1.28 | 0.69
After 1980 | 1.19 | 1.17 | 0.83 | 1.20 | 1.50 | 0.77
Birth Order First Daughter (Other) | 0.57 | 0.53 | 0.40 | 0.56 |
Co-residence with Parents+ | -0.44 | -0.52 |
(No) | |
Women’s Income+ | |
(Less than 2,000,000 yen) | 0.79 ** | 0.72 ** | 0.84 ** | 0.93 * | 0.67 ** |
2,000,000-2,990,000 yen | 1.48 *** | 1.28 *** | 1.52 *** | 1.42 * | 1.20 *** |
3,000,000-3,990,000 yen | 1.24 * | 1.30 ** | 1.37 ** | 1.79 * | 1.25 ** |
4,000,000 yen -- | |
Women’s Occupation+ | |
(Out of Employment) | 1.18 ** |
Professional/Managerial | |
Clerical/Sales/Service | 1.08 ** |
Manual/Agreculture/Other | 0.76 |
Cohabitation Experience before Marriage+ | |
(No) | 0.84 ** | 0.69 ** |
Premarital Pregnancy+ | |
(No) | 1.53 *** | 1.53 *** | 1.50 *** |
Latent Class | |
(Neutral) | |
Conservative | 1.45 |
Progressive | -2.66 * |
Log-likelihood | -702.83 | -706.61 | -695.42 | -653.43 | -642.45 | -705.20 |
BIC | 179.84 | 180.16 | 177.44 | 169.68 | 179.46 | 174.82 |
N | 358 | 358 | 358 | 358 | 358 | 358 |
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Note: Reference categories in parentheses.
+ is a time-varying covariate.

Summary and Conclusion

Since the latter half of the 1970s, Japanese age at marriage has started to rise in tandem with a decline in the proportion of people ever-married. As mentioned
before, mean age at first marriage for men and women stood at nearly age thirty in 2012. In addition, dependent marriages, cohabitations, and divorces have increased in number. These phenomena have gradually emerged in Japan since the 1980s.

Looking at Japanese society from a broad perspective, we can recognise that women’s socio-economic circumstances have changed drastically over the past few decades. The number of women engaged in gainful employment has increased in tandem with a rise in the percentage of women going to college or university. Although the faltering financial climate after the economic bubble of the 1980s suppressed the pace of this change, the economic empowerment of Japanese women still continues to expand. At the same time, however, people’s attitudes towards family and lifestyle have also changed during the same period.

The main purpose of this paper was to investigate the influence of economic and ideational factors on marriage behaviour in Japan. The results of the analysis, first of all, suggest that economic factors are important to marriage in Japan. In fact, men and women with a high level of income tended to get married with a greater probability than those with a lower level of income. Furthermore, people engaged in a professional or a managerial job also were more likely to enter into marriage.

Second, the findings of this paper indicate that ideational factors, at the same time, affect marriage behaviour in Japan, although their effects were influential. Indeed, More progressive attitudes reduced a risk of male marriage. Likewise, the probability of women’s entry into marriage was decreased in tandem with the strengthening of both progressive and individualistic attitudes. It can therefore be concluded that Japanese marriage behaviour is affected by both economic and ideational factors.

Taking the above results into consideration, we may conclude that economic and ideational factors affect Japanese marriage behaviour. In other words, we may argue that ideational changes originating in Europe have now reached the Far East.

References


